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ABSTRACT. The criminal law declines to punish merely for bad attitudes that are not
properly manifested in action. One might try to explain this on practical grounds, but
these attempts do not justify the law’s commitment to never punishing unmanifested
mental states in worlds relevantly similar to ours. Instead, a principled explanation is
needed. A more promising explanation thus is that one cannot be criminally culpable
merely for unmanifested bad attitudes. However, the leading theory of criminal cul-
pability has trouble making good on this claim. This is the theory that an action is
criminally culpable to the extent that it manifests insufficient regard for legally pro-
tected interests. The trouble is that this theory’s defenders have not adequately ex-
plained what it is for an action to manifest insufficient regard. In this paper, I aim to
provide the required account of manifestation, thereby rendering the insufficient re-
gard theory more defensible. This, in turn, allows the view to explain the broad range
of doctrines that treat unmanifested mental states as irrelevant. The resulting theory of
criminal culpability is both descriptively plausible and normatively attractive. More-
over, it highlights the continuity between criminal culpability and moral blamewor-
thiness by showing how the former functions as a stripped-down analogue of the latter.
Many criminal law doctrines treat mental states that are not manifested
in conduct in the right way as irrelevant. A ‘basic premise of Anglo-
American criminal law is that no crime can be committed by bad
thoughts alone’.1 Nor do we enhance punishments merely because we
know one was willing to offend in worse ways. If I want to kill my enemy
1 WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 6.1 (2d ed.). See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 489
(1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (‘Our whole tradition is that a man can be punished… only for specific acts
defined beforehand to be criminal, not for general misconduct or bearing a reputation for such miscon-
duct’.); Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference’ Simply Punish for ‘Bad Character’?
Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219, 234 (2002)
(‘the harsh sanctions of the criminal law should not be brought to bear on individuals who have not yet
done anything wrong, but who merely have disreputable – or even dangerous – character traits’).
Law and Philosophy  The Author(s). This article is an open access publication 2017
DOI 10.1007/s10982-017-9301-9.
but am bribed to only beat him up instead, I’m not guilty of murder
simply because I was willing to go that far. As Ken Simons notes, ‘we are
… properly[] reluctant to impose punishment on a person simply for
[attitudes or characteristics] unless and until [they] are expressed in
action’.2 Similar thinking lies behind the concurrence requirement be-
tween mens rea and actus reus: the former must be expressed in (i.e.
cause) the latter in the right way for there to be a proper basis for guilt.3
Furthermore, one’s motives for breaking the law generally do not
matter.4 A thief is not guilty of a more serious offense because he is
motivated by hatred of the victim rather than wanting to be able to
afford a better school for his child. In determining criminal guilt, such
motives don’t count as manifested. The affirmative defenses function
similarly: ‘[W]hen an individual finds himself in a position where the
law grants him the right to kill another in his own defense, it makes no
difference whether his dominant motive is other than self-preserva-
tion’.5 An executioner authorized to carry out a death sentence com-
mits no crime even if his actual motivation is the desire to see the
prisoner die gruesomely.6 However, there are exceptions to the
criminal law’s general lack of concern with motives. A few offenses –
like treason,7 kidnapping8 and hate crimes9 – include bad motives as an
element. Motives may also affect sentencing.10
2 Simons, supra note 1 at 234.
3 Under this rule, guilt requires not only that one possesses the required mens rea while doing the
relevant actus reus, but also that ‘the defendant’s mental state actuate[] the physical conduct’. WAYNE
LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3 (2d ed.). See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 199 (6th ed.) (‘[t]he defendant’s conduct that caused the social harm must have been set into motion
or impelled by the thought process that constituted the mens rea of the offense’); Alex Sarch, Knowledge,
Recklessness and the Connection Requirement Between Actus Reus and Mens Rea, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1
(2015).
4 WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 5.3 (2d ed.) (‘[M]otive, if narrowly defined to exclude recognized
defenses and the ‘specific intent’ requirements of some crimes, is not relevant on the substantive side of
the criminal law’.).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Treason requires purpose to aid an enemy of the state, and mere knowledge that this will result
does not suffice. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641–42 (1947); WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. §
5.2 n.9.
8 Kidnapping often requires a prohibited purpose like obtaining a ransom or terrorizing the victim.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (stating that one ‘is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes
another … with any of the following purposes: (a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or
hostage; or (b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or (c) to inflict bodily injury on
or to terrorize the victim or another’).
9 Hate crimes carry harsher punishments if one acted ‘because of the actual or perceived race, color,
religion, or national origin of any person’. 18 U.S.C. § 249.
10 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 90 (2006).
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My aim here is to explain this jumble of doctrines concerning
unmanifested mental states. I won’t do so by offering a general theory of
what it is for an action to manifest a mental state. Rather, I defend a theory
of criminal culpability that explains why culpability is not impacted by the
mental states that criminal law doctrine treats as unmanifested.
My topic therefore is criminal culpability, not moral blameworthi-
ness.11 The latter, roughly, is what makes one an apt target of reactive
emotions like resentment and indignation, while the former deter-
mines the extent to which one’s conduct merits condemnation by the
criminal law.12 All else equal, criminally culpable act tokens warrant
punishment and act types that comprise solely such tokens are aptly
criminalized (perhaps on the condition that it’s not bad policy).
My theory follows the growing trend of understanding criminal
culpability in terms of insufficient regard. On this view, one is culpable
for an action to the extent it manifests insufficient regard (or disrespect)
for the legally protected interests of others or protected values more
generally. Insufficient regard is a species of ill will – more specifically,
making mistakes in the way one recognizes, weighs and responds to
the reasons that bear on how to act.13 If one attaches so little weight to
others’ interests that one burns down a building for the insurance
despite knowing someone is inside, one acts from insufficient regard.
Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan endorse such a view,14 as do Peter
Westen,15 Gideon Yaffe16 and others.17
One attraction of this view is that it both preserves a connection
to moral blameworthiness and recognizes the ways in which the law
is different. On the influential quality of will theory, acts are morally
11 In principle these concepts could be identical, though I mean to leave it open precisely how
they’re related.
12 At least this is the case setting aside considerations of luck. Some might think the punishment one
merits can be impacted not only by culpability, but also by how much harm one causes – even if due in
part to luck. (Thanks to Massimo Renzo for this worry.) I doubt this would be normatively defensible,
but can’t argue for this view here. Rather, I aim to sidestep the issue by focusing on pairs of defendants
who both cause the same amount of harm.
13 GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 38 (2011) (endorsing the view that an action is culpable to the degree that
‘it is a product of a faulty mode of recognition or response to reasons for action’).
14 LARRY ALEXANDER AND KIMBERLY FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 67–68 (2009) (arguing that ‘insuf-
ficient concern [is] the essence of culpability’).
15 Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 289, 373–74 (2006) (‘a person
is normatively blameworthy for engaging in conduct that a statute prohibits if he was motivated by an
attitude of disrespect for the interests that the statute seeks to protect’).
16 See Yaffe, supra note 13; Gideon Yaffe, Intoxication, Recklessness, and Negligence, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 545, 552–53 (2012). See also Yaffe infra notes 21 and 54.
17 Simons, supra 1 note at 249–50; Alex Sarch, Double Effect and the Criminal Law, CRIM. L. &
PHILOSOPHY (2015).
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blameworthy to the extent they manifest ill will, which can be
understood as attaching insufficient weight to the relevant moral
reasons.18 The insufficient regard theory takes criminal culpability to
consist in manifesting insufficient regard for the applicable legally
recognized reasons. Thus, criminal culpability would be a simplified
analog of moral blameworthiness, with the former sensitive to only
some considerations that impact the latter.
Despite its attractions, the insufficient regard theory of criminal
culpability also faces challenges. Most importantly, it is far from clear
what it means for an action to manifest insufficient regard. Propo-
nents of the view are rarely precise about how to determine the
amount of insufficient regard an act manifests.19 But the theory
cannot do without an account of this key notion, given the many
doctrines showing that punishment does not directly correspond to
how much insufficient regard one possesses but does not manifest.
One might possess tremendous ill will towards others, but if it’s not
revealed in action in the right way, the appropriate predicate for
punishment is not present. What I’ll argue is that answering this
challenge for the insufficient regard theory lets us account for the
above doctrines concerning unmanifested mental states.
Of course, it might be tempting to explain these doctrines merely
as a function of our epistemic and practical limitations. It will often
be complicated and costly to determine and evaluate the attitudes
the defendant had while acting. So perhaps it is prudent for the law
to ignore unmanifested bad attitudes.20 However, this pragmatic
18 See Julia Markowitz, Acting for the Right Reasons, 119 PHIL. REV. 201 (2010); NOMY ARPALY AND TIM
SCHROEDER, IN PRAISE OF DESIRE 170 (2014).
19 Throughout this paper, I assume that insufficient regard is a scalar concept. This is because I take
criminal culpability itself to be scalar. As I understand it, culpability is the main – perhaps only –
determinant of how serious an offense one is guilty of and thus the sentencing range one is subject to.
Thus, if the present theory is to capture this scalar notion of criminal culpability, insufficient regard
must itself be taken to come in degrees.
20 This position has recent defenders. See, e.g., David Lefkowitz, Blame and the Criminal Law, 6
JURISPRUDENCE 451, 462–65 (2015). Lefkowitz argues it’s for practical reasons that we shouldn’t punish
unmanifested insufficient regard, even though in principle we could. He mentions three practical limi-
tations. First, there is an ‘epistemic challenge’ in proving that one who complies with the law ‘nevertheless
lacks an attitude of proper regard for others’ legally protected interests’. Id. at 465. Second, we face the
‘practical challenge of designing and operating a criminal justice system that punishes…mere bad attitude
crimes without [causing] corruption and abuse’. Third, the state’s limited resources might prevent it from
‘even investigating your bad attitude crimes, let alone prosecuting them’. Id. See also Martin R. Gardner,
The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV.
635, 685–86 (1993) (using practical reasons to show why the law shouldn’t require proof of ‘evil motive’:
‘[a]ctual motives are often hidden… in the subconscious’ and ‘are difficult to evaluate’; and ‘[s]erious…
motivational analysis would require trial courts to consider detailed case histories of each defendant’,
which often are ‘unavailable to prosecutors at the time necessary to charge the crime’).
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explanation does not capture the full strength of the principles the
law is committed to. Suppose our practical limitations are tem-
porarily alleviated. Most simply, the defendant might simply admit
(credibly) that he had very bad attitudes while acting. Even then,
however, it is doubtful that we should punish him merely for his bad
attitudes or do so more harshly for his willingness to commit worse
crimes. Still, in such a case, our practical limitations would provide
no bar to doing so.
Thus, my aim is to offer a principled explanation of when and why
criminal law doctrine is not concerned with unmanifested mental
states. I’ll offer an account of what it means to manifest a particular
level of insufficient regard, which explains (i) why one is not culpable
for bad attitudes one merely possesses but does not act on, and (ii)
why one is not more culpable for breaking (or complying with) the
law for bad rather than good motives. In this way, answering the
main challenge for the insufficient regard theory endows it with
significant explanatory power. The resulting theory, I’ll argue, is
highly normatively attractive as well.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I recounts the reasons
why the insufficient regard theory must include a manifestation
requirement at all. Section II argues against the two most natural
accounts of manifesting a given level of insufficient regard: the purely
causal account, and the epistemic account. Section III then presents my
own account. It is partly causal, but also draws on what Gideon Yaffe
has dubbed a ‘principle of lenity’.21 While Section III aims to give a
descriptively adequate framework, Section IV sketches a normative
argument for the view.
I. WHY A MANIFESTATION REQUIREMENT IS NEEDED
A theory of criminal culpability should be descriptively adequate in the
sense that it captures the core features of the law in the jurisdictions
one cares about. My focus is Anglo-American criminal law. To
capture its core features, the insufficient regard theory needs a
manifestation requirement. This can be seen by considering some
unsatisfactory formulations of the theory.
21 Gideon Yaffe, The Point of Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance, CRIM. L. & PHILOSOPHY (2016).
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To start, our theory must respect the voluntary act requirement.
This is the rule that we don’t punish without voluntary conduct.22 If
one unconsciously lashes out while asleep, one is not guilty of
assaulting one’s partner. One has no criminal culpability. This sug-
gests:
(IR*): The criminal culpability of D’s voluntary action A equals the amount of
insufficient regard D possesses while doing A.
However, the voluntary act requirement is notoriously easy to
satisfy. As long as the defendant engaged in some relevant voluntary
conduct, the requirement is satisfied.23 Thus, (IR*) is inadequate. It
allows one to be culpable merely for innocuous actions done while
possessing a deficient level of regard for others. Consider:
TED THE WOULD-BE TERRORIST (V.1): Ted hates people he perceives as ‘‘foreigners’’
and wants to bomb a mosque. But he hasn’t taken any steps towards doing so yet.
A CIA agent learns of his sentiments and bribes him $10,000 not to bomb the
mosque. Ted agrees. He is willing to go through with the crime and the only
reason he refrains is the bribe. Instead, Ted decides to paint his fence – though
while he does so his hatred of Muslims has not abated.
Ted’s act of painting the fence satisfies the voluntary act require-
ment, and (IR*) entails that he is criminally culpable. But this is
implausible. While Ted is clearly highly morally blameworthy and
has a deplorable character, he is not appropriately subject to criminal
liability. We do not punish merely for a willingness to offend. As
LaFave puts it, a ‘basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law is
that no crime can be committed by bad thoughts alone’.24
Perhaps Ted is not criminally culpable because he did not violate
any legal prohibition of the sort that we’d likely see in Anglo-
American jurisdictions. Thus, a better theory would be:
22 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (‘A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is
based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is
physically capable’.); LaFave, supra note 1 (observing that criminal liability requires ‘an act, or an
omission to act where there is a legal duty to act’, and that a ‘bodily movement, to qualify as an act
forming the basis of criminal liability, must be voluntary’).
23 To see how easily satisfied this requirement is, note that one can be guilty of criminal homicide
despite being asleep at the time one causes death if one previously felt extremely sleepy but continued
to drive anyway. Here, the defendant’s ‘voluntary act consists of driving the car, and if the necessary
mental state can be established at the time’ (e.g. recklessness) it is enough for guilt. LaFave, supra note
1. Moreover, even possession can count as an act. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4).
24 LAFAVE, supra note 1.
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(IR**): D’s action A is criminally culpable to degree n if and only if (1) A violates a
criminal prohibition and (2) A was done while D possessed a level of insufficient
regard that equals n.
However, this will not do either. For one, (IR**) entails that actions
can’t be criminally culpable without violating existing criminal
prohibitions. But some act types may not yet have been criminalized.
So (IR**) can at best only capture jurisdiction-specific culpability
attributions, not the underlying notion of culpability that the law
should be tracking. Our theory should do both.
Moreover, (IR**) is implausible because it attributes enhanced
culpability to defendants who are willing to behave in worse ways
than they did. Suppose Ted did violate a legal prohibition:
TED THE WOULD-BE TERRORIST (V.2): Ted still is committed to bombing a mosque.
But he can’t get ahold of any explosives right now. Instead, he does the greatest
amount of damage he is able to under the circumstances, which is to spray-paint
anti-Muslim slurs on a public building – a criminal offense where he lives.
(IR**) entails that Ted is highly culpable. He engaged in voluntary
conduct that violates a criminal prohibition while possessing
seriously deficient regard for others. According to (IR**), Ted’s
culpability is pegged to what he is willing to do (i.e. attempt a
bombing), and thus is far greater than that of someone who paints
racist slurs without being willing to bomb a mosque. But this is
implausible. Just as we do not punish for a bare willingness to offend,
we also refrain from punishing merely for a willingness to behave in
worse ways than one actually did. As Simons notes, ‘we are …
properly[] reluctant to impose punishment on a person simply for
[attitudes or characteristics] unless and until [they] are expressed in
action’.25 The full level of insufficient regard Ted possesses is not
completely manifested. He seems less culpable than (IR**) entails.
To avoid these problems, we need a manifestation requirement.
Thus, the theory should say:
(IR): D’s action A is criminally culpable to degree n if and only if the degree to
which A manifests insufficient regard equals n (regardless of how much D hap-
pened to possess when doing A).
25 Simons, supra 1 note at 234.
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(IR) matches legal theorists’ canonical statements of the theory,26
and helps explain why we don’t enhance punishments merely
because one was willing to offend in worse ways than one actually
did. After all, without actually doing the worse offense, one’s
willingness is not manifested. But what, in turn, explains this? (IR)
remains incomplete because we still need to know what it is to
manifest insufficient regard to a particular degree.
II. EXPLAINING MANIFESTATION IS HARDER THAN YOU MIGHT THINK
Explaining how much insufficient regard an action manifests is the
big challenge for such theories. This section argues against the two
most natural proposals.27 I do not claim to conclusively refute these
views, but merely seek to motivate my own account presented be-
low.
A. The Pure Causal Approach
The most natural account takes it that an action manifests a given
amount of insufficient regard just in case possessing this amount is
what causes one to do that act. This approach is naturally suggested
by the concurrence requirement, which requires that the mens rea of
the offense must ‘actuate’ the requisite actus reus.28 This require-
ment embodies a theory of mental state expression: An action ex-
presses a mental state, intention or attitude just in case the former
causes the latter (in the right way). However, what we want is an
account of manifesting a given level of insufficient regard, which de-
pends on one’s whole configuration of attitudes and reflects how one
weighs the relevant reasons. Thus, the causal theory we’re interested
in is this:
Pure causal approach: An action A manifests a level of insufficient regard n if and
only if (and because) A is caused by a configuration of mental states that consti-
tutes level n of insufficient regard towards legally protected interests or other
protected values.
26 See supra notes 14–16.
27 Elsewhere I have argued against other attempted solutions to this problem, particularly as it arises
for moral blameworthiness. See Alex Sarch, Review: N. Arpaly & T. Schroeder, In Praise of Desire (Oxford
2014), 31 ECONOMICS & PHILOSOPHY 320, 324–27 (2015).
28 See supra, note 3.
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I call this the pure causal approach, since it might just be one
component of a more sophisticated theory of manifestation. In fact,
this is true of my account, which is a partly causal view.
The pure causal approach is attractive, since it captures the insight
behind the concurrence requirement. Unless this requirement is
satisfied (e.g. if one only acquires the mens rea of the crime after
doing the actus reus), the pure causal approach does not permit the
full degree of insufficient regard inherent in the crime to be mani-
fested in one’s conduct.
However, the pure causal approach has problems. Simply put,
causation is not sufficient for manifestation. As many cases show, the
amount of insufficient regard that causes an action does not always
correspond to the amount the action manifests. Recall the following
chestnut29:
KILL YOUR UNCLE: Dennis and Charlie intend to kill their respective uncles today.
They both have exactly the same motivations and attitudes. Both take a drive to
clear their heads and think further about when to do the killing. While driving,
Dennis happens to see his uncle on the street and shoots him then and there. Since
Dennis intentionally kills, he is a murderer. By contrast, Charlie, while lost in
thought and driving carelessly, hits a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle –
his intended victim. Charlie, unlike Dennis, did not commit murder. He caused his
uncle’s death, but only negligently (not intentionally).
Dennis and Charlie are stipulated to have exactly the same
motivations and attitudes.30 They both intend to kill. They have
equally deplorable characters and levels regard. On some views, they
would be equally morally blameworthy.31 Still, there is an intuitive
sense in which what Charlie did is less culpable. Dennis is a
murderer, but we wouldn’t affix that label to Charlie.
The insufficient regard theory would try to capture this by
maintaining that Charlie’s conduct did not manifest as much insuf-
ficient regard as Dennis’s did, such that Charlie’s conduct is less
culpable. But it’s unclear whether the pure causal approach to
manifestation can deliver this result. Charlie’s high level of insuffi-
29 I’ve adapted this example from Simons’s discussion of the case, which he culls from John Searle.
See Simons, supra note 17 at 232; JOHN SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 82
(1983).
30 As a reviewer notes, we must suppose neither Charlie’s nor Dennis’s plan includes a conditional
intention to kill their uncle through careless driving if the opportunity presents itself. This might also
make Charlie guilty of murder.
31 P. Graham, A Sketch of a Theory of Blameworthiness, 88 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL AFF. 388, 396–99
(2014).
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cient regard – i.e. the configuration of attitudes that includes his
intention to kill – does seem somewhat causally active in producing
the conduct that resulted in his uncle’s death. It caused him to take
the drive. This suggests that the amount of insufficient regard
manifested is not identical to that which is causally active in pro-
ducing one’s conduct. (There are answers a proponent of the pure
causal approach may try, but I doubt they succeed.32)
As noted below, this case might be handled by other theories (like
Alexander and Ferzan’s). Still, the present problem goes deeper.
Other cases show that an action might not manifest all the insuffi-
cient regard that caused it. Consider a legal version of a case of
Arpaly and Schroeder’s33:
TRIVIAL WRONGS: Jack and Jill each obtain software that removes fractions of cents
from others’ bank accounts and transfers the money to the software operator. Jack
decides to use the software to enrich himself because he naively sees it as a
practically harmless prank. He would not be willing to impose greater harms even
if he could. By contrast, Jill harbors profound hatred towards the members of her
community (whom she takes to be sinful and unclean). She wants to impose as
much pain and suffering on them as possible. It just so happens that this is the
greatest harm she is currently able to inflict since she is in a remote location and
very sick. Given her bottomless ill will, she would jump at the chance to cause
vastly more harm (even death) if she could. Indeed, she hopes to use the money
obtained with this software to some day purchase the means to wreaking more
havoc (though she hasn’t decided how). Jack and Jill’s conduct is otherwise the
same: They each use the software to remove a total of $500 from a large number
of bank accounts.
Jill’s conduct is caused by vastly more insufficient regard than that
which caused Jack to act the same way. Thus, the pure causal
account entails that Jill’s conduct is vastly more culpable than Jack’s.
But this is doubtful, I submit. Both impose the same small harms on
their victims and neither actor has any justification. Instead, their
32 A proponent of the pure causal approach might respond that Charlie’s killing his uncle was caused
only by his mental state of negligence, not the further mental state of intent to kill. Perhaps Charlie’s
intention to kill was merely free-floating – i.e. not causally active in producing the conduct that led to
the death. However, this response requires the questionable assumption that Charlie’s configuration of
mental states at the time can be carved up into different components, one of which – his negligence –
was causally active, and another of which – his intent to kill – was not. However, it is not clear that
mental states can be separated so neatly. Wasn’t Charlie’s intent somewhat causally active? He went for a
drive to plan the killing, so he was driving in part because of his intention. Perhaps, then, the intention
didn’t play enough of a causal role in causing the act. Still, it is extremely hard to specify how much of a
causal role a mental state must play for it to impact the insufficient regard an action manifests.
33 See Arpaly and Schroeder, supra note 18 at 188–89 (discussing a praiseworthiness analog about a
lost motorist).
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acts seem roughly equally culpable: They would be convicted of
equally serious offenses and face the same sentencing range.34
Accordingly, the full degree of insufficient regard that caused Jill’s
conduct does not seem to be manifested in her offense. What cases
like this show, as Arpaly and Schroeder note, is that the amount of
‘ill will that an action manifests is not the same as the amount of …
ill will that exists and is being acted on’35 – a point the pure causal
approach fails to capture. (Arpaly and Schroeder suggest that only
some acts provide occasion to manifest extreme ill will, but I’ve
argued this reply fails.36)
A final, related problem is that the pure causal approach has
trouble capturing the default rule that motives (i.e. one’s aims in
acting) generally are ‘not relevant on the substantive side of the
criminal law’.37 This rule is familiar, e.g., from the law’s approach to
defenses. Consider:
EVIL TROLLEY TURNER: Darryl finds himself in the classic trolley scenario. A trolley is
careening toward five people who are tied to the tracks. It will kill them unless Darryl
pulls the switch, and diverts the trolley onto another track to which just one person is
tied, Vicky. Thus, if Darryl pulls the switch, only one person will die, rather than five.
Darryl knows all this and decides to divert the trolley onto the other track. However,
his sole reason for doing so is that he hates Vicky and wants her dead. He doesn’t care
one whit for the five on the other track, and he wouldn’t bother to pull the level
unless doing so would allow him to accomplish his aim of killing Vicky.
Darryl is highly morally blameworthy. He has a horrible character,
and harbors deplorable attitudes and is willing to act on them.
Nonetheless, in many jurisdictions, Darryl would get the benefit of a
necessity defense. As LaFave notes, when ‘the law grants [a person]
the right to kill another in his own [or someone else’s] defense, it
makes no difference whether his dominant motive is other than self-
preservation’.38 ‘[T]he law is not concerned with motive once facts
34 An anonymous reviewer notes that even if Jack and Jill face the same sentencing range, perhaps
Jill should be sentenced at the high end of the range and Jack at the low end. Still, the pure causal
approach is in trouble for taking Jill to be vastly more culpable than Jack. In addition, even if Jack and Jill
should be sentenced slightly differently, I suspect that this is due to the broader range of considerations
that legitimately impact sentencing – e.g. deterrence and rehabilitation. It does not obviously show a
difference in culpability of the sort that matters at the guilt stage of a case. Moreover, I am open to the
idea that sentencing can consider more fine-grained differences in moral blameworthiness than typically
would (or should) matter at the guilt stage. (I discuss this at length in Subsection III.C.)
35 Id.
36 Sarch, supra note at 27 at 324–27.
37 WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3 (2d ed.).
38 Id.
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supporting the defense have been established’.39 Many legal scholars
endorse this view.40
Nonetheless, the purely causal approach cannot deliver this result.
Darryl was caused to act as he did by a configuration of attitudes that
constitute an extremely high level of disregard for the protected
interests of others. Thus, this approach entails Darryl is highly
criminally culpable.
Of course, some might challenge the criminal law’s position on
this issue by trying to individuate actions more finely. One might
claim that (i) switching to kill Vicky is a different action from (ii)
switching the trolley to save the five. If acts can be individuated this
finely, then we might say that what Darryl did was the highly cul-
pable act of doing (i) rather than (ii). Of course, this strategy faces
difficult questions about how to describe and individuate actions.
While I take this response to be a live option (it has well-known
defenders41), I want to offer a theory of criminal culpability that at
least is able to capture the criminal law’s approach from above,
which is maximally generous to criminal defendants. That is, I want
to be able to explain why it at least makes sense for defendants to get
the benefit of all the defenses available to them based on the facts
they were aware of in acting. The view I defend below can do this by
taking it that Darryl’s bad attitudes do not count as manifested.
Notice that the default rule that motives don’t matter is not just a
feature of the way the law treats defenses. An analogous point ap-
plies with respect to the elements of a crime. Consider:
GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF: Mary’s child is having a hard time at pubic school, so she
steals $5000 from an ATM to be able to send her child to a better private school.
By contrast, Barry is bored and wants to go to Vegas. He steals $5000 from an
ATM to be able to afford the trip.
The pure causal approach says that because Barry’s action was
caused by a configuration of mental states that constitutes a much
more deficient level of regard than that which caused Mary to act,
Barry is more criminally culpable. But this fits poorly with legal
39 Id.
40 Larry Alexander, The Means Principle, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY
OF MICHAEL MOORE 28 (K.K. Ferzan and S.J. Morse, eds., 2014) (‘[I]f the switcher believes switching will
save the five, then his switching the trolley is nonculpable even if his only reason for doing so is to kill the
one on the siding’. (emphasis in original)). See also Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 14 at 60–61 (defending
a similar view).
41 See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM 156 (2011) (endorsing this response to the present case).
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practice. In most jurisdictions, Barry would not be treated as more
criminally culpable and convicted of a worse offense just because he
had worse motives for breaking the law.42 Neither Mary nor Barry
has a recognized justification for their conduct.43 Granted, Barry’s
worse motives might matter at sentencing, but at least when it
comes to the offense he is to be convicted of – i.e. the level of
culpability imputed to him at the guilt stage of the trial, which fixes
the applicable range of sentences – Barry’s worse motives are
irrelevant. Thus, we want our theory to explain why motives do not
matter to the sort of criminal culpability that is central to substantive
criminal law doctrine applicable at the guilt stage. The pure causal
theory isn’t up to the job.44
B. Other Theories?
My present aim is to motivate the account of culpability I offer
below. However, as a reviewer pointed out, I won’t succeed in this if
other theories easily capture the cases I discuss. I cannot argue
against all other theories here. But to further motivate my view, let
me note some challenges for one other leading insufficient regard
theory, which also is causal in nature.
Alexander and Ferzan take culpability to be a function both of (i)
the magnitude of risk that one perceives one unleashes on others and
(ii) the reasons that impelled one to do so.45 Keeping the one factor
42 See WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.2 (2d ed.) (‘[A] good motive will not normally prevent
what is otherwise criminal from being a crime. Thus it is nonetheless … larceny that one stole a rich
man’s money to give his impoverished family a better life’). See also U.S. v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 921
(11th Cir. 1983) (stating that for crimes aimed at financial gain, ‘a person would be just as guilty if the
motive were … to obtain money for a worthy cause’).
43 WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 5.3 (2d ed.) (‘[T]here are numerous … cases where a person
has been found guilty of a crime in spite of what might be viewed as a good motive in committing it’).
44 A reviewer suggests the pure causal approach might be modified to say that an act is criminally
culpable to degree n if it is proximately caused by a degree of insufficient regard equal to n. If proximate
cause is understood in terms of directness, I don’t think this will help. In TRIVIAL WRONGS, Jill’s minor
misconduct is directly caused by a tremendous degree of insufficient regard. Nonetheless, her act doesn’t
seem tremendously culpable. It is only roughly as culpable as Jack’s. Thus, it might be better to
understand proximate cause in terms of normative considerations designed to limit the implausible
implications of the view. However, in that case, the theory begins to look indistinguishable from the
normatively constrained causal theory I defend below in Section III. On my theory, the amount of
insufficient regard manifested is determined using normative assumptions like the principle of lenity.
Thus, my theory is partly normative just like the best understanding of the proximate cause approach.
Still, my theory is more illuminating because it specifies exactly how the relevant normative consid-
erations operate, rather than letting them be diffusely applied through intuitions about what suffices for
proximate causation.
45 See Alexander & Ferzan supra note 14 at 18.
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fixed, one is more culpable the worse one is with respect to the other
factor – i.e. the greater the perceived risks one unleashes or the
worse the reasons that led one to do so. The theory is causal in
nature because it makes culpability depend in part on the reasons
that caused one to act, which reflect one’s level of regard for others.
Alexander and Ferzan can capture KILL YOUR UNCLE. An actor,
they say, is not culpable ‘until he engages in conduct that he believes
unleashes a risk of harm over which he no longer has complete
control’.46 Charlie does not irrevocably unleash as great a risk of
death as Dennis, so Charlie is less culpable than Dennis although
they acted for equally bad reasons.
Nonetheless, Alexander and Ferzan’s view does not sit comfort-
ably with the default rule, seen above, that motives generally don’t
matter in substantive criminal law doctrine. It is at least a point in
favor of a theory if it gives a principled explanation of how this
default rule can be sensible. In TRIVIAL WRONGS, Jack and Jill irre-
vocably unleash the same magnitude of perceived risk on others.
Because Jill does so for vastly worse reasons than Jack, on natural
assumptions it follows from Alexander and Ferzan’s view that Jill’s
act is vastly more culpable than Jack’s.47 Nonetheless, it fits better
with legal practice to take the two to be roughly equally culpable.
Both were aware that they unleashed the same harms, and the
simple fact is that neither had any (even partial) legally cognizable
justification for doing so. Thus, Alexander and Ferzan’s view has
trouble with this case. The view seems to place no limit on how
culpable one can be for even a minor offense provided only that one
did it for bad enough reasons.48
Alexander and Ferzan’s view also faces some internal tension. On
the one hand, they acknowledge that motives don’t matter when
one’s action is justified.49 As long as the actor is aware of the
applicable ‘justifying reasons, it should not matter that the actor is
not motivated by those reasons’.50 Thus, they would say in EVIL
46 Id. at 19. See also id. at 50.
47 See id. at 27 (claiming that ‘even very tiny risk impositions can be culpable if imposed for
insufficient or misanthropic reasons’).
48 For similar reasons, Alexander and Ferzan’s view also seems an awkward fit with the case of TED
v.2. Ted’s violation was caused by a huge amount of ill will towards Muslims. Still, his culpability for
the fairly minor offense he committed is not as massive as would be suggested by the exceptionally
criticizeable reasons for which he acted.
49 Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 14 at 60–61.
50 Id. at 61.
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TROLLEY TURNER that Darryl is just as free from culpability as the
analogous trolley turner with benevolent motivations. On the other
hand, Alexander and Ferzan’s theory also allows one’s reasons (or
motives) to affect culpability where the act is an unjustified viola-
tion.51 Accordingly, in GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF, they would allow that
Barry’s bad motives can make his theft more culpable than Mary’s
similar act done for more sympathetic reasons – although this sits
uncomfortably with posited law.52
I don’t claim that Alexander and Ferzan’s view in GOOD THIEF BAD
THIEF is normatively implausible. Indeed, I want my theory to leave
room for this as a possible normative position (while also explaining
as sensible the default irrelevance of motives in posited law). My
main point instead is that it seems unstable to maintain both that
motives do not impact the culpability calculus for justified actions of
the sort seen in EVIL TROLLEY TURNER, but that motives do affect the
culpability of unjustified acts as in GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF.53 This
may not be a decisive objection, but I think there are benefits to
seeking a unified account that treats motives as impacting the cul-
pability calculus the same way in all cases. My view aims to do this.
C. The Epistemic Approach
An altogether different approach to understanding manifestation is
epistemic. It focuses on the level of insufficient regard we would infer
the actor possesses:
Epistemic approach: An action A manifests a level of insufficient regard n if and
only if (and because) a rational, unbiased observer would infer from the relevant
evidence that the defendant who did A possessed a level of insufficient regard
equal to n when doing A.
What does ‘the relevant evidence’ mean here? It can’t mean all the
facts. Then the theory would say an action manifests as much
insufficient regard as a fully informed observer would infer the actor
possessed. But the fully informed observer would of course know
51 For instance, they agree that their theory commits them to the claim that ‘because the purpose of
Frankie’s trip is illicit [when she carefully drives off to kill Johnny], all risks she adverts to are themselves
illicit’ and render her culpable even for her careful driving. Id. at 50. Frankie’s culpability here is due just
to her bad reasons.
52 See supra note 42–43.
53 Compare Alexander and Ferzan supra note 14 at 50 with id. at 59–60.
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what level of insufficient regard the actor actually possessed. Thus,
she would recognize that negligent Charlie had just as little regard
for others as his murdering counterpart Dennis. So the theory gets
KILL YOUR UNCLE wrong. Instead, ‘the relevant evidence’ more
plausibly means the available evidence – i.e. the reasonably obtainable
evidence that can be introduced at trial. Typically, the available
evidence would not allow us to infer that Charlie had any mens rea
but negligence. After all, were Charlie called to answer for his uncle’s
death, he likely would disavow any intent to kill.
This view can be strengthened further. Gideon Yaffe is developing
a more sophisticated version of the epistemic approach, which is
similar in spirit to the theory I develop below. The view is still under
construction, so I hesitate to discuss it in detail. But one fixed feature
of his view deserves mention. He postulates a principle of lenity,
which ‘requires us to determine what the defendant’s conduct says
about his [level of insufficient regard] under the assumption that he
is as little different from the law-abiding citizen as possible, given his
behavior’.54 This principle, ceteris paribus, ‘bars us from being neutral
between the hypothesis that the defendant is bad and the hypothesis
that he is very bad’.55 Thus, there is a rebuttable presumption that
Charlie only acted with the insufficient regard of negligence, not the
level of murder.
However, I doubt that either of these refinements – without more
– is sufficient to render the epistemic approach defensible. In par-
ticular, one wonders about the case where the available evidence
conclusively shows that Charlie in fact had the intention to kill, and
thus a correspondingly higher level of insufficient regard. The
prosecution might call a psychologist to testify, based on in-depth
interviews (or brain scans), that Charlie actually intended to kill.
More simply, perhaps Charlie is now overwhelmed by guilt and just
admits on the stand that he did in fact intend to kill his uncle. Such
scenarios are at least possible. In such a case, a reasonable observer
would justifiably infer from the available evidence – even given the
principle of lenity – that Charlie was not just negligent, but had the
intent to kill. Accordingly, the epistemic approach, even with these
refinements, entails that Charlie’s action manifests the level of
54 GIDEON YAFFE, AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, chap. 3, at
30 (forthcoming 2017).
55 Id.
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insufficient regard associated with murder – not just negligent
homicide.
The difficulty here is that the available evidence is highly change-
able. Often, the available evidence will only allow us to infer that
defendants like Charlie are negligent. But sometimes the evidence
would clearly show them to be willing to behave in far worse ways
than they actually did. The epistemic approach does not fully pre-
clude fixing their culpability by reference to the far worse acts we
know their low levels of regard would make them willing to do.56
That, however, conflicts with fundamental commitments of the
criminal law.57
The epistemic approach likewise has trouble capturing the rule
that motives generally don’t matter to culpability. Suppose in EVIL
TROLLEY TURNER, we’re quite sure Darryl’s actual motivation for
turning the trolley was just to kill Vicky. Perhaps he simply admits it
on the stand. The epistemic approach then entails that Darryl would
not get the benefit of a necessity defense. But this conflicts with a
widespread view in the law. Similarly for GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF.
Suppose Barry admits he stole the money just because he was bored
and wanted to gamble. The epistemic approach entails that Barry is
more culpable than others who steal for more sensible reasons. But,
again, that is not the law’s view. It does not take worse motives to be
the basis for convicting one of a worse offense. Moreover, even if
one thinks the law’s view here is mistaken,58 our theory should at
least be able to capture such a widespread aspect of the law.
Of course, it is always open to defenders of the epistemic ap-
proach to say that motives generally don’t matter only because of
practical reasons – i.e. only because it is usually hard to identify and
evaluate defendants’ actual motives for breaking the law. Nonethe-
less, I think this pragmatic explanation is unsatisfying. It does not
capture the full strength of the principles to which the criminal law is
committed. After all, in some cases our practical limitations will be
alleviated – i.e. where we do know the defendant’s motives and have
56 For similar reasons, one might worry that the epistemic approach would sometimes allow one to
be criminally culpable merely for one’s attitudes even if they have not yet resulted in any action.
57 See supra notes 1–2.
58 However, the law’s view has much to recommend it. It seems more charitable to defendants that
a) they be given the benefit of defenses that exist on the facts as they believe them to be, and b) for the
law to ignore particularly bad motives (like Barry’s) and treat all offenders the same as if they broke the
law for less egregious reasons.
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no trouble evaluating them. And in such cases, the epistemic ap-
proach gives no reason not to punish Darryl and Barry to the full and
much harsher level that their bad motives might seem to call for. But
the law does not change its view on this point when our practical
limitations are temporarily alleviated. Even when we know with
certainty what Darryl’s and Barry’s motives are and how seriously
deficient their regard for others is, the law does not depart from its
stance that Darryl gets the defense and Barry is not to be convicted
of a more serious offense.
Accordingly, I remain skeptical about the prospects for the epis-
temic approach – though I have not decisively refuted it. More work
might yield better answers.59 But we at least have reason to continue
looking for alternative ways to understand manifesting insufficient
regard.
III. TOWARD A BETTER THEORY OF CRIMINAL CULPABILITY
This section aims to formulate a better insufficient regard theory by
providing the sought-after account of manifestation. Thus far, sev-
eral partly overlapping data-points have emerged. These should
preferably be given a principled explanation, which applies even in
isolated cases where our practical limitations are alleviated. Two are
fairly basic:
(i) Act Requirement: Only voluntary conduct can be criminally culpable.
Merely possessing bad attitudes that one does not act on cannot be
criminally culpable.
(ii) No punishment without prohibited conduct: A legal system will not attri-
bute culpability to you unless you’ve violated one of that system’s
prohibitions (though in principle these prohibitions could be norma-
59 Perhaps we could adopt certain presumptions – based on principles of political morality – to
constrain the body of evidence from which we may draw inferences about the defendant’s level of
insufficient regard. If we can block the evidence suggesting that Charlie actually possessed a worse
mental state than negligence – e.g. the psychiatric testimony or brain scans that reveal his intention to
kill his uncle – perhaps the observer could be blocked from inferring that Charlie possessed more
insufficient regard than the amount seen in negligence. However, I’m skeptical about this strategy.
What guarantee is there that the problems won’t just re-emerge in isolated cases where the available
evidence clearly rebuts the presumptions? Moreover, I think it will be hard to specify ex ante all the
forms of evidence from which we might infer that the defendant was willing to act in worse ways than
she actually did. It seems especially difficult to rule out such evidence stemming from admissions by the
defendant that she had worse mental states or was willing to do worse things than her conduct at first
revealed.
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tively mistaken). One is not criminally culpable if one complies with
the law – even if it is for very bad reasons.
Moreover, we have seen several data points relating to the idea that
one should not be punished for bad attitudes, or a willingness to
offend, unless it is manifested in action:
(iii) Punishment only for actual conduct, not for willingness to behave in worse
ways: The criminal law should not attribute greater culpability merely
because one would be willing to act in worse ways than what one
actually did. Examples include TED THE WOULD-BE TERRORIST v.1 and
v.2, as well as KILL YOUR UNCLE.
(iv) The Concurrence Requirement: To be guilty of a crime, the defendant’s
mens rea must concur with (i.e. actuate) the actus reus of the crime.60
This means one cannot be punished merely on the basis of mental
states acquired after doing the actus reus. Rather, some causal-ex-
planatory nexus is needed between mens rea and actus reus.
However, (iv) must also be tempered by the following data point,
which posed a problem for the pure causal approach to manifesta-
tion:
(v) The amount of ‘ill will … an action manifests is not the same as the amount
… that exists and is being acted on’.61 Thus, one’s act may not manifest
the full amount of insufficient regard or animosity that actually im-
pelled one to act – as when very bad attitudes cause one to act in ways
that are only slightly criticizeable. An illustration is TRIVIAL WRONGS.
Finally, our theory must explain the complexities of the role of
motives in the criminal law:
(vi) Motives generally don’t matter: Substantive criminal law doctrine usually
is not concerned with one’s motives for acting. First, as (i) suggests,
one is not criminally culpable for acting lawfully even for bad reasons.
An example is EVIL TROLLEY TURNER. Second, substantive criminal law
doctrine usually is not concerned with one’s reasons for violating the
law. An illustration is GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF. But, third, there are
exceptions to the default irrelevance of motives – as with (a) crimes of
60 See supra note 3.
61 Arpaly and Schroeder, supra note 18 at 188.
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which bad motives are an element and (b) the role of motive in sen-
tencing – which must also be explained.
I will defend a theory that captures these data-points. It has two
components: (a) a necessary condition on culpability, i.e. a
Manifestation Requirement, and (b) an account of how much
insufficient regard is manifested. Under (a), culpability requires
that insufficient regard is a cause of one’s act. Under (b), how
much the act manifests is largely independent of how much one
possesses. I explain each component in turn. But first, the
notion of culpability must be clarified.
A. Two Notions of Criminal Culpability
I have largely ignored an important distinction to this point. We
must distinguish between the amount of culpability a jurisdiction
actually attributes and the amount it ideally should. Call the juris-
diction-specific notion posited culpability. Suppose a jurisdiction rec-
ognizes no distinction between starting a fire in a building while
knowing it is occupied and doing so without any such knowledge.
Both types of arsonist are convicted of the same crime and subject to
the same range of sentencing options. There is a sense in which this
jurisdiction attributes the same amount of culpability for both forms
of arson. They thus have the same amount of posited culpability.
However, there is also a sense in which this is normatively
implausible. The same amount of culpability plausibly should not be
attributed to these two forms of arson. The one arsonist disrespects
the value of human life far more than the other. This suggests a
normative notion of criminal culpability, which is what the law ideally
should track. Normative criminal culpability is especially important
for critical purposes. We can meaningfully ask how much normative
culpability an action possesses even if it has not yet been criminal-
ized. Or we might ask whether the posited culpability a jurisdiction
attributes for an offense matches its normative culpability.
The insufficient regard theory can easily capture this distinction. It
claims that an action is criminally culpable to the extent it manifests
insufficient regard for legally protected interests or values – i.e. the
legally recognized reasons that bear on whether to do the act.62 We
62 This idea of legally recognized reasons is also used by Gideon Yaffe. See Yaffe, supra notes 21 and 54.
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can capture this distinction, then, by distinguishing (i) the interests,
values or reasons that the law actually recognizes as bearing on
whether to do the act from (ii) the ones that it should recognize. We
can identify the interests, values or reasons in the former group by
looking, e.g., at how harshly the jurisdiction punishes different types
of conduct. The ones in the second group (the ones the law should
recognize) are discernable via normative theorizing and policy
assessment.
This distinction helps account for data-point (ii). For an action to
possess posited culpability, it clearly must violate an existing criminal
prohibition. After all, no well-functioning legal system that respects
the principle of legality would permit punishment for an action that
does not violate an existing prohibition. But this is not required for
an action to be normatively criminally culpable. The law in a given
jurisdiction might fail to protect certain interests or values (i.e. rec-
ognize certain reasons) that it ought to. One can manifest insufficient
regard for interests or values the law should protect without violating
an existing prohibition. Therefore, data-point (ii), only is a necessary
condition on posited culpability, not normative culpability.
While the theory I offer below is primarily designed to capture
posited culpability, the same framework also accounts for normative
culpability. To do so, we simply need to ask how much insufficient
regard an action manifests not for the interests and values that the
law actually seeks to protect (i.e. the reasons it actually recognizes),
but rather for the ones it should.
B. The Necessary Condition: Inadequate Repulsion from Criminality Must
be a Cause of Your Act
Focusing on posited culpability for now, we reach the core question.
On the present view, the criminal law’s basic demand is not to avoid
possessing insufficient regard, but to avoid manifesting it in conduct.
What does this mean? The causal approach offers promising start: To
manifest insufficient regard, an action must be caused by it. But as
seen above, the pure causal approach fails because our actions do not
necessarily manifest the full amount of insufficient regard that caused
them. Thus, causation by insufficient regard seems to be only a
WHO CARES WHAT YOU THINK?
necessary condition for culpability. The amount manifested is a sepa-
rate issue, discussed below.
This idea of causation by insufficient regard requires clarification.
Importantly, it is not the same as being caused by animus. Actions
can be culpable without such a cause. Instead, we can profitably
understand this idea as failing to be sufficiently repelled by criminality.
This happens when the legally recognized reasons against the action
(i.e. the protected interests or values it threatens) fail to motivate one
to avoid doing it. Causation by lack of contrary motivation63 thus lies
at the heart of an action’s being caused by insufficient regard.
This does not mean the law requires one to be motivated by the
legally recognized reasons to comply. Its demand is only that one
have some motivations or other that prevent one from breaking the
law. A convenient way to encapsulate this is to say that the law
requires us to have some kind of repulsion mechanism whose job it is
to repel us from criminality and to see to it that we are motivated to
always act in legally justifiable ways. By ‘legally justifiable action’, I
mean an action such that, under the facts as you believe them to be, the
legally recognized reasons in its favor outweigh those counting
against it. Thus, the repulsion mechanism is supposed to be
responsive to the balance of available legal reasons that bear on your
actions, and its task is to ensure that you always are motivated (in
some way or other) to behave in ways that are supported by the
balance of legal reasons. (I include the limitation to the facts as you
believe them to be because criminal culpability is supposed to be
largely a subjective notion, not just an assessment of whether one
lives up to an objective standard – as in tort law.)
Crucially, the law is indifferent to the content of one’s repulsion
mechanism. Any motivations can in principle do the job.64 Regard-
less of whether you are motivated to comply with the law for self-
interested reasons, out of respect for law, to be seen as respectable,
or for a hodge-podge of different reasons, the criminal law has no
complaint against you. Its basic demand is only that some motiva-
tional failsafe kicks into repel you from criminality when necessary.
63 Arpaly and Schroeder convincingly defend this sort of causation as scientifically respectable. See
supra note 18.
64 And when it fails to keep you within the bounds of legally justifiable conduct, it has the secondary
job of motivating you to commit only the least bad violation possible (i.e. the one least disfavored by
the legal reasons).
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This begins to capture the law’s default indifference to motives. To
summarize:
Insufficient regard as repulsion failure: An action, A, that violates a legal pro-
hibition65 (i.e. satisfies the elements of a crime and is not otherwise justified)
manifests insufficient regard for legally protected interests or values (i.e. the legally
recognized reasons) only if the actor’s repulsion mechanism is part of what caused
A.
What, then, is involved in causation by repulsion failure? Two
requirements must be met:
Causation by repulsion failure: Your action A was caused in part by a failure of
your repulsion mechanism if:
(a) Your repulsion mechanism was actually called upon to do some work
under the circumstances – i.e. called on to provide motivation against
doing A, since it would be an unjustifiable violation of the law under
the facts as you believe them to be – and
(b) Your repulsion mechanism failed to do the job it was called on to do
(i.e. provide enough motivation to behave as required), such that you
actually went on to perform A.
Only when the failure of your repulsion mechanism helps cause your
conduct in this sense66 is it manifested in that conduct. After all,
even if the safeguard mechanism whose job it is to keep you
within the bounds of legally justifiable conduct is faulty, this
failure won’t be manifested until the mechanism is actually called
on to do its job, but doesn’t. Before that, the failure of the
mechanism is just a latent defect that has not yet been
manifested.
What, then, does it mean for one’s repulsion mechanism to be
called on to do work in motivating one not to act unjustifiably? For
posited culpability, it is fixed by the prohibitions in the jurisdiction.
65 To get an account of normative culpability, just replace this with ‘a prohibition the law should
recognize’.
66 On this account, the repulsion failure is usually going to be a but-for cause of the action.
However, one could imagine Frankfurt-style over-determination cases where the repulsion failure (i.e.
one’s insufficient regard) actually led one to do the act, but where the repulsion failure was not a but-for
cause. Perhaps other forces would have intervened to get one to do the action if the repulsion
mechanism hadn’t failed. Thus, I think repulsion failure strictly speaking needn’t be a but-for cause of
the action. Rather, it just has to be an actual cause of the act – on whatever the best account of causation
turns out to be. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.)
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In passing a criminal code, the legislature takes a stand on the nor-
mative question of when citizens’ repulsion mechanisms should be
called on. Of course, the legislature may get this wrong. Its laws
might call on the repulsion mechanism to motivate one in ways that
it should not. Criticizing the law in this way moves us into the realm
of normative culpability.
Indeed, there are intuitive limits on when it would be fair to
expect the repulsion mechanism to do work. It would be a blatant
mistake to call on us to be motivated to avoid that which is
impossible to resist. If someone pushes you off a bridge, your
repulsion mechanism cannot be called on to motivate you not to fall.
Similarly, it seems unfair for your repulsion mechanism to be called
on to do work when you are neither engaged in any (relevant)
conduct nor have any duty to act. When you are neither acting nor
failing to discharge a duty, you are having no relevant effect on
anyone else. In such cases, it would be odd and unfair for your
repulsion mechanism to be called on to do any work. If that’s right,
the repulsion mechanism should not be called on to avoid bad
attitudes that are in no way revealed in action. As a result, one
cannot be normatively culpable merely for possessing bad attitudes.
(Section IV further argues for this.)
Putting all this together, we get the following necessary condition
on criminal culpability:
Manifestation requirement: The conduct of a competent, practically rational
actor67 that violates a legal prohibition68 is criminally culpable only if a failure in
her repulsion mechanism is part of the cause of that conduct (in the above sense).
One might question whether all of criminal law really involves such
a requirement. What about crimes that require specific bad purposes
or desires? Do they also involve only the failure to be repelled by
criminality? Treason, we saw, requires the overt purpose of aiding the
enemy; hate crimes require the desire to harm those with certain
67 This claim is meant to apply only where the actor is at least minimally competent or practically
rational. One who doesn’t weigh the reasons incorrectly but violates a statutory prohibition only due
to, say, a psychotic episode should not be deemed to have manifested insufficient regard. Thus, excused
offenses are excluded from the present claim.
68 Again, for normative culpability, just replace this with ‘a prohibition the law should recognize’.
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racial, gender or other protected characteristics – not just failure to
be repelled by this result.69 So don’t these crimes involve an overt
attraction to evil, not insufficient repulsion therefrom?
The main answer is that to be affirmatively attracted to a bad
state of affairs is to overvalue the reasons in favor of bringing it about,
which is equivalent to proportionally undervaluing the reasons
against doing so. In my view, culpability depends on whether one
attaches weight to the relevant reasons in the right proportion – not
the absolute amount of weight one gives them.70 Thus, when one
overvalues the reasons in favor of a crime and doesn’t attach cor-
respondingly greater weight to the reasons against, one can be de-
scribed as undervaluing the reasons against the crime in the proportional
sense (i.e. compared to the weight attached to the reasons in favor of
the act). Hence, treason and hate crimes involve proportionally
undervaluing the reasons not to act with attitudes like racial animus
or a desire to aid the enemy – a form of insufficient regard. (This
worry also admits of other answers.71)
Introducing this Manifestation Requirement already goes quite a
ways to capturing the data from above. It explains data-points (i), and
parts of (iv) and (vi). First, it captures the voluntary act requirement
in (i) and the related idea that one cannot be criminally culpable
merely for possessing bad attitudes. After all, you do not count as
manifesting insufficient regard when you merely possess bad attitudes
that don’t produce any action. This, in turn, is because the necessary
condition above is not satisfied. Under existing law (and any plau-
sible set of normative assumptions), the repulsion mechanism would
not be called on to do any work in such cases. It is only called on to
ensure that you don’t act in ways that cross the line into unjustifiable
conduct (i.e. that are not supported by the balance of legal reasons
that exist given the facts as you believe them to be). When you
merely possess a bad attitude and don’t act on it, there is nothing for
69 See supra notes 7–9.
70 See Sarch, supra note 17. I doubt the notion of the absolute weight given to a reason is even
intelligible.
71 In addition, the basic duty not to manifest insufficient regard can give rise to subsidiary duties –
perhaps to prevent oneself from allowing certain proscribed attitudes from influencing one’s conduct
(i.e. to be so repelled by them that one keeps them in check). In this way, affirmative attractions to bad
states of affairs can be culpability aggravators, which come in addition to the culpability of direct failures
to be repulsed by bad states of affairs in their own right. Cf. id. (especially section 3).
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your repulsion mechanism to kick into correct. So no failure of this
mechanism is manifested.72
Second, the necessary condition helps explain some aspects of the
concurrence requirement in (iv). It shows why you cannot be
criminally culpable if you form the mens rea of the crime after doing
the actus reus. There, too, no repulsion failure actually helped cause
your conduct. For a failure of your repulsion mechanism to help cause
your conduct, you at least had to possess the mens rea of the crime
either before or during your performance of the actus reus.
Finally, the necessary condition helps explain part of (vi) – i.e.
why motives don’t matter to whether one possesses a defense.
(Other explanations are available too, as noted below.) In EVIL
TROLLEY TURNER, Darryl turns the trolley not in order to save the five
but to kill the one on the other track. Why might this actor – despite
clearly having insufficient regard – still get the benefit of the justi-
fication available to him based on the facts he was aware of? After all,
he wasn’t actually motivated by the facts that justify his conduct. One
answer is that, although he possessed insufficient regard, it wasn’t
manifested in his conduct. Plausibly, his repulsion mechanism was not
called on to do any work in this case. Since his conduct (turning the
trolley) was justified on the facts as he knew them to be, no failure of
his repulsion mechanism was part of what actually caused his con-
duct. Even though his repulsion mechanism was clearly faulty at the
72 One might worry that my theory could in principle allow punishing merely for bad attitudes.
(Thanks to Gideon Yaffe for this worry.) If the legislature criminalizes a particular attitude (e.g. disliking
the supreme leader), then our repulsion mechanisms may be called on to motivate us to prevent
ourselves from developing this attitude. Failing to properly manage one’s own mental states to block
this attitude from taking root might thus be a repulsion failure.While it’s true that my theory thus has
the resources to explain what is happening in such cases, that is a feature not a bug. For it’s also true
that my theory explains what has gone wrong in such cases: The legislature has endorsed a view about
what work the repulsion mechanism is called on to do that is obviously unjustifiable on normative grounds.
There are a range of moral, policy and practical reasons that explain why, in any world similar to ours,
we should never punish merely for bad attitudes. (Section IV also mounts a principled argument for this
claim.) This explains why the repulsion mechanism should never be called on to provide motivation to
block the development of bad attitudes alone (as opposed to motivating us to prevent them from
impacting our conduct, which can be legitimately required). Thus, although my theory does not render
punishment for mere attitudes conceptually impossible, it does explain why this is would be prohibited
under any minimally plausible set of normative assumptions – which I go on to justify directly in Section IV.
ALEXANDER SARCH
time, the fault remained latent. So no failure of the mechanism
helped produce his conduct.73
C. How Much Insufficient Regard is Manifested?
The theory is not yet complete. We still must answer the question of
how much insufficient regard an act manifests to know how culpable
it is. As we saw, an action’s being caused by a given amount of
insufficient regard is not sufficient for manifesting that amount. My
answer to this question employs a version of Yaffe’s principle of
lenity.74 But while Yaffe’s is epistemic, and constrains what we may
infer from the available evidence, my principle is non-epistemic:
Principle of lenity: D’s action, A, only manifests the least amount of insufficient
regard for legally protected interests or values (i.e. the least amount of error in
weighing the legally recognized reasons) that is needed to explain why a rational
and otherwise well-motivated person would do A (i.e. what D did under the
relevant description75) in the circumstances as D believed them to be.
The motivation for this principle is that the state, given its superior
power, should resolve any ambiguity in its punishment practices in
favor of accused citizens. This is a principled way to resolve difficult
normative questions: when in doubt, benefit the defendant. I’ve
discussed other justifications for this principle,76 and Section IV gives
a further normative argument for it.
73 Does my view thus mistakenly entail that we shouldn’t punish ‘factually impossible’ attempts?
Factual impossibility traditionally was not a defense to attempt charges. See Yaffe supra note 13 at 112.
But perhaps my view entails the opposite? When Jane tries to kill Victor by sticking pins into a voodoo
doll replica of him, my view might suggest she doesn’t merit punishment because her repulsion
mechanism wasn’t called on to get her to avoid this act. If no repulsion failure caused her act, she isn’t
culpable. (Thanks to Kim Ferzan for this worry.)
However, my view can avoid this result. The question of what the repulsion mechanism is called on to
do is a normative question for the legislature in each jurisdiction to resolve. Quite plausibly, though, the
best normative view is that one’s repulsion mechanism is called on to halt one’s attempted misconduct
even in cases of factual impossibility. On the facts as Jane believes them to be, putting pins in the doll
will kill Victor. Thus, it’s very plausible that the law should call on her repulsion mechanism to motivate
her not to stick pins in the doll. Hence, Jane would be culpable for attempting to kill Victor in this case.
In this way, my view can capture the result that factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt
charge.
74 Yaffe, supra note 21.
75 As discussed below, it is an important question how this action, A, is to be described. When
determining the culpability of an action that already counts as a crime in the relevant jurisdiction – i.e.
when calculating posited culpability – the salient description of the act is given by the elements of the
applicable statute. So it will typically include not just the relevant body movements, but also any
required mens rea or attendant circumstances. However, when there is no statute on point prohibiting
the conduct – as when we’re concerned with normative culpability – it will be up for debate what the
most apt description is. Different contexts plausibly call for different descriptions.
76 See Sarch, supra note 3 at 32 n.97; Sarch, supra note 17 at 23 n.74.
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Of course, the devil is in the details. How do we determine what
this ‘least amount of insufficient regard’ is? To start, I follow Yaffe in
understanding insufficient regard for legally protected interests and
values as committing an error in how one weighs the legally recognized
reasons that bear on how to act.77 Next, distinguish the insufficient
regard possessed when acting from the amount the action manifests.
Culpability is pegged to the latter, not the former. My view uses an
idealized procedure to determine the magnitude of the error in
weighing the relevant legal reasons that a given action manifests.
This procedure compares the motivations (i.e. weighing of reasons)
of (a) the rational, perfectly law-abiding citizen and (b) the citizen
who does the crime but represents the smallest possible departure from
the law-abiding person.
To flesh out the idea, let’s use a model of the ideal case – i.e. the
motivations of the perfectly law-abiding citizen (‘PC’). PC weighs the
reasons for and against any putatively criminal action, A, she could
perform the correct way. That is, she assigns weight to the legally
recognized reasons for or against A exactly in line with the law’s
view of how they should be weighed.
To be more precise, assume first that the facts as the defendant,
D, in the actual case believes them to be are true. (After all, this is a
subjective culpability inquiry we’re engaged in.78) Given the facts as
D believes them to be, suppose there is a set of legally recognized
reasons against A.79 Call this set of reasons R-. These reasons will
usually involve the legislature’s reasons for criminalizing acts of type
A (i.e. the interests or values this conduct was criminalized to pro-
tect).80 Suppose there is a certain amount of weight that, according
to the law, should be attached to these considerations. Let ‘X’ denote
this amount, the correct weight. For PC, R- = X.
For completeness, suppose there also are some legally recognized
reasons in favor of A. Perhaps A would promote some legitimate
interests or prevent unjustified harms to others. Call this set of
reasons R+. Suppose there is a certain amount of weight that,
77 Yaffe, supra note 21.
78 Cf. Alexander, supra note 40 at 24 (‘Moral permissibility turns on how things really are, not on
what an actor believes … Culpability, on the other hand, is a matter of the actor’s beliefs’.).
79 To turn this into an account of normative culpability, rather than posited culpability, we would
focus not on the reasons that the law actually recognizes, but rather the reasons that the law should
recognize (whatever they are).
80 Note that this is just a hypothesis about what the real reasons are. The law can get this wrong.
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according to the law, an actor should attach to these considerations.
Let ‘Y’ denote this amount, the correct weight. For PC, R+ = Y. Of
course, because A is assumed to be unjustified, it must be the case
that X>Y.
PC’s key characteristic, then, is that she is motivated by all and
only the legally recognized reasons bearing on A, and she weighs
them correctly. Thus, she does not actually perform A. Now, the
core question to determine how much culpability a criminal action
manifests is this:
Core question: What is the smallest possible departure from the motivations of the
perfectly law-abiding citizen (PC) that would get an otherwise well-motivated
person to do the criminal action A under the circumstances as the actual defendant
believes them to be?
That is, what is the smallest amount of incorrectness in the weights
attached to the legally recognized reasons for and against A that is
needed to get an otherwise well-motivated person to do the criminal
action A under the facts as the actual defendant, D, believes them to
be? This is going to be our measure of how much insufficient regard is
manifested in D’s performance of A.
The Core Question admits of a general answer, indicating how
culpable D’s actual action is.
Answer to core question: The smallest amount of incorrectness in the weights
attached to the legally recognized reasons bearing on criminal action A that would
lead an otherwise well-motivated person to do A given the facts as the actual
defendant believes them to be equals an amount just infinitesimally larger than X
minus Y (i.e. the correct weight to be attached to the legally recognized reasons
against A, or R-, minus the correct weight to be attached to the legally recognized
reasons in favor of A, or R+).
Why is that? Call the otherwise well-motivated citizen OC. This
person represents the smallest departure from the motivations of PC
that would be needed to get someone to do A under the
circumstances as D believes them to be. To get someone to do A,
more weight must be attached to R+ than to R-. This means that the
least possible amount that OC’s valuation of the weights of the reasons
for and against A must be off the mark by in order to get her to do A is
just slightly more than X-Y. If R+ = R-, the actor’s valuation of the
reasons bearing on A would be in equipoise and no action would
result. So what’s needed is an amount slightly greater than this.
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But what is the proof? How do we know the least amount of
incorrectness in weighing reasons that would be needed to get OC to
do A is just slightly greater than X-Y? To see why, note that there
are three ways OC might attach more weight to R+ than to R-, and
thus do A:
(1) OC attaches the right amount of weight to R+ (i.e. Y) but undervalues
the reasons in R- so the total weight of R- dips down from X to a
point below Y.
(2) OC attaches the right amount of weight to R- (i.e. X), but overvalues
the reasons in R+ so the total weight of R+ rises from Y to a point
above X.81
(3) OC both undervalues R- somewhat (so it’s below X) and overvalues
R+ (so it’s above Y), and these mistakes together are big enough to
make it the case that R+ >R-.
In all three cases, the least amount of error in weighing reasons that’s
required to get R- to be lower than R+ is the same: It’s just slightly
more than the difference between the correct weights for these two
sets of reasons, viz. X and Y, respectively. Think of it like the levers
on a sound mixing board, with one lever for R+ and another for R-.
Ideally, the R- level should be at X, and the R+ level should be at Y
(where X>Y). The smallest total distance that the two levers would
have to traverse so that R+ >R- is just infinitesimally greater than
X-Y. If they in total traversed a distance exactly equal to X-Y,
then the two levers would not cross; at most they could end up at
the same place, so that R+ = R-. Thus, for the R+ lever to pass the
R- lever, such that R+ >R-, the smallest distance the two levers
must traverse – the smallest error in weighing reasons that’s needed
– is an amount just slightly greater than X-Y. Using this model, we
can now characterize how much insufficient regard an unjustified
action manifests:
Level of manifestation: The amount of insufficient regard manifested in defendant
D’s unjustified action (assuming D is at least minimally competent and practically
rational) directly corresponds to the least amount of error in weighing reasons that is
needed to get an otherwise well-motivated person (OC) to do A under the circum-
81 Note this could happen either by overvaluing some legally recognized reasons that belong in R+ ,
or by erroneously including reasons in R+ which aren’t legally recognized as counting in favor of A at
all.
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stances as D actually believed them to be. That is, action A manifests an amount of
insufficient regard that is just slightly greater than X- Y (as defined above).
A manifests an amount of insufficient regard just slightly in excess of
X-Y because that is the smallest amount of error in weighing
reasons needed to transform PC into OC. This is a principled
approach. The amount manifested is not just a matter of how
offended or harmed the victim is. Nor is it a matter of how bad we
can infer the actor’s response to reasons is given the available
evidence, as Yaffe frames his view.82 This approach would be
unreliable because the evidence might be incomplete or inaccurate.
My approach side-steps such evidential problems.
By adding this second component to the theory, we can explain
the remaining data-points: (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi). Data point (iii) was
that the law should not attribute greater culpability merely because
one was willing to act in worse ways than one actually did. Recall
TED THE WOULD-BE TERRORIST v.2. The salient description of what he
did is given by the violation he committed: defacing public buildings
with racist slogans. Thus, his culpability corresponds to the least
amount of insufficient regard for legally protected interests and
values that it would take to get OC, an otherwise law-abiding citizen,
to behave as Ted did. Suppose the perfectly law-abiding citizen, PC,
would recognize no reasons in favor of this action (as with a great
many crimes). Moreover, given the interests and rights of the vic-
tims, PC would attach five units of weight to the reasons against this
action. Thus, the smallest amount of error in weighing reasons that
could get OC to behave as Ted did is an amount that is slightly
greater than five units. (The size of the units doesn’t matter, so long
as they’re consistent across cases.) Granted, Ted wanted and was
willing to behave in far worse ways. And Ted might have actually
assigned, say, ten units to the reasons in favor of this act and just 0.1
units against. But this is neither here nor there. The full amount of
insufficient regard he possessed and acted from is not manifested. It
reflects only a character flaw of the sort the law ignores. In this way,
my theory explains why he is not more culpable just because his bad
attitudes make him willing to behave worse than he actually did.
82 See generally Yaffe, supra note 21 (discussing the ‘inferences’ we may draw about culpability from the
defendant’s conduct); see also id. at 9 (observing that ‘[i]nformation about the agent’s psychological state at
the time of action gives us information about the’ factors that bear on culpability, and ‘[t]he principle of
lenity mandates that we assign [culpability levels that are] as low as possible, consistent with the evidence’).
WHO CARES WHAT YOU THINK?
For similar reasons, the theory explains the concurrence
requirement in (iv). It states that a mens rea you possess when acting
is appropriately connected to the actus reus only if the former caused
(actuated) the latter. Recall KILL YOUR UNCLE, where Charlie negli-
gently killed someone who turned out to be the person he intended
to murder. Charlie is not guilty of murder, only negligent homicide.
To account for this under the concurrence requirement, one might
argue that Charlie’s intent did not play the right kind of causal role in
producing his action – though specifying what this causal role is
appears difficult. But my theory offers a simpler explanation of this
case. The amount of insufficient regard manifested in an action
equals the least amount of error in weighing reasons that’s needed to
get OC to do the same conduct under the circumstances. The least
amount of insufficient regard needed to get OC to perform Charlie’s
actual conduct – i.e. cause a death through carelessness – is the
amount seen in negligence, not the far greater level associated with
intentional killing. PC will appreciate and be motivated by the legally
recognized reasons to pay adequate attention to the road while
driving. Thus, the smallest error in attaching weight to legal reasons
needed to get OC to behave as Charlie did is the amount involved in
not attaching enough weight to the reasons to pay attention to the road
– i.e. the amount in negligent unawareness of the risks he imposed.83
So this is all the insufficient regard Charlie’s actual conduct mani-
fests. Even if he was willing to act worse than he did, his conduct
does not manifest this fact about him.84
83 A reviewer objects that my view does not explain Charlie’s sort of inadvertent negligence, which
does not involve the deliberate choice not to pay attention to the road. However, my view does not
require a choice or the conscious weighing of reasons in order for an action to be culpable. Rather, all it
requires is that the applicable legal reasons were accessible to one but failed to motivate one to abstain
from the prohibited conduct. (Failing to pay attention to the road does not have to stem from a decision
to attend to something else.) Nonetheless, on my view, negligent act A, done while being distracted in
ways one ought not to be, can be culpable if A is caused in part by the failure to be sufficiently
motivated to pay attention to the road. The insufficient regard A manifests lies in the failure to attach
sufficient weight – whether consciously or unconsciously – to the legal reasons that exist to pay
attention to the road and thus avoid A. Of course, this is just a sketch of how my account might explain
inadvertent negligence. Much more must be said to adequately address this difficult topic.
84 We could also get this result from the Manifestation Requirement. The only repulsion failure that
was causally active in producing Charlie’s conduct was the failure to be motivated to pay sufficient
attention to the road. Had Charlie had gone on to commence an intentional killing, his repulsion
mechanism would have been called on to motivate him to cease it. But he never got to that point. So
this more egregious repulsion failure wasn’t any cause of his actual conduct. In fact, his repulsion
mechanism was only called on to motivate him to pay sufficient attention to the road, which it failed to
do. Thus, only this smaller repulsion failure was actually causally active.
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My theory also captures the additional wrinkle in (v). This was
Arpaly and Schroeder’s point that one is not always culpable to the
full extent of the bad attitudes ‘that existed and were acted on’ –
even if these attitudes were causally active in producing the act in
question. Recall TRIVIAL WRONGS. There, the actual cause of Jill’s
decision to use the software to skim small amounts of money from
her victims’ accounts was bottomless ill-will. Nonetheless, the
insufficient regard Jill’s act manifests seemed rather small. The reason,
on my view, is that the minimum amount of error in weighing the
relevant legal reasons needed to get OC to do Jill’s action under the
circumstances as she believed them to be is far less than the amount
she actually possessed and acted on. Thus, the full extent of her
bottomless ill-will was not manifested in what she did.
The same reasoning also allows us to answer a common objection
to the Model Penal Code’s implicit claim that a knowledge crime is
always at least ceteris paribus more culpable than the analogous
recklessness crime.85 Suppose D1 disregards a substantial and
unjustified risk of death (say, a 30% chance) but is thoroughly callous
about it. He cares not at all for his victims. By contrast, D2’s situ-
ation is exactly the same as D1’s except that D2 knowingly causes a
death (i.e. is aware of a practical certainty that it will result), but has
great regret and hesitation about doing so. Suppose these two cases
are otherwise identical: Neither D1 nor D2 has any justification for
their acts. Isn’t D1 worse than D2? Why can D2 be convicted of a
more serious offense than D1?
Again, the answer is that while D1 may be a worse person, this
fact is not manifested in his conduct. D1’s act does not manifest the
full amount of insufficient regard he possessed. Rather, it manifests
the least amount of insufficient regard – the smallest error in
weighing reasons – needed to get OC to do this reckless act under
the circumstances as D1 believed them to be (i.e. impose a perceived
30% chance of death without justification). But this is less than the
amount of insufficient regard that D2’s act manifests – i.e. the least
85 See Kenneth Simons, Punishment and Blame for Culpable Indifference, 52 INQUIRY 143, 146 (2015).
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amount needed to get OC to knowingly cause death (or recognize she
is making it practically certain) without justification.86
Finally, my theory can account for the complex role of motives in
the criminal law. However, to do so, we need to attend to an issue
I’ve glossed over thus far: How are we to describe what the defendant
did when assessing culpability? Where the relevant description does
not mention the defendant’s specific motives for breaking the law
(only the actus reus he did and the mens rea that caused him to do
it), my theory straightforwardly explains why one’s subjective mo-
tives or aims do not impact the amount of insufficient regard
manifested in one’s action. After all, on my view, it would equal the
minimum amount of insufficient regard (i.e. the smallest amount of
error in attaching weight to reasons) needed to get OC to do the
same conduct so described.
This gives a straightforward to way to capture cases that illustrate
the default rule. In EVIL TROLLEY TURNER, if what Darryl did is de-
scribed without mentioning motives – i.e. turning the trolley while
aware that this will save five lives – it would not take any insufficient
regard to get an otherwise well-motivated person, OC, to behave the
same way. After all, the act is justified. Accordingly, even though
Darryl was actually motivated by bad attitudes, the amount of
insufficient regard his conduct manifests, thus described, is zero.
Hence, my view is perfectly able to explain the law’s position that
the defendant gets the benefit of the defenses that exist on the facts
he is aware of – even if these justifying circumstances did not
actually motivate him.
GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF can be handled the same way. If we use a
motive-free description, Mary and Barry did the same thing: stealing
something of value while aware that it did not belong to them. And
86 Note one limitation. If there were facts about D2 that, for legal purposes, partially but not fully
justified her conduct (e.g. if causing the death would prevent her friend from being injured), though
these facts are not present in D1’s case (i.e. D1 has no partial justifiers), then my view would not entail
that D2 is more culpable than D1. All else is not equal between these two cases. It might well take less
insufficient regard to get someone like D1 to recklessly cause death without any justification than it
does to get someone like D2 to knowingly cause a death that is very nearly but not quite justified.
(Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.)
Of course, the law of actual jurisdictions may not recognize all the partial justifiers it should. For
example, Mary in GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF should perhaps have a partial justifier that Barry lacks. But this
is at most a problem for the jurisdiction in question, not my view. Were the law changed to give Mary a
partial justifier, e.g. so she’s guilty of a lesser offense, then my view could capture that result as well. My
view makes posited criminal culpability a function of whatever the legally recognized reasons are. (And
to determine normative culpability, we would need to take a position on what reasons the law should
recognize – a question I cannot settle here.)
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neither was aware of facts that amounted to a defense. (In the cir-
cumstances as they believed them to be, the theft was not necessary
to prevent imminent bodily injury or death, etc.) Thus, it would take
the same amount of insufficient regard to get OC to do what they
both did. Thus, Barry (who stole for bad reasons) would not merit
greater condemnation than Mary (who stole for not quite as bad, but
still insufficient reasons).
Of course, some might reject the standard legal view on these
issues. One might think it is normatively mistaken to ignore motives
in such cases. Isn’t Darryl worse than someone who turns the trolley
to save the five? Isn’t Barry worse than Mary, since she was moti-
vated at least somewhat by altruistic considerations? It is a virtue of
my account that it also can capture this view – if that’s what one
prefers. To do so, we simply need to adopt a thicker, motive-laden
description of what was done. We get a harsher result in EVIL
TROLLEY TURNER by describing what Darryl did as turning the trolley for
the sole purpose of killing one person and not at all in order to save the
five.87 The least amount of insufficient regard needed to get OC to do
this more richly described action would be quite high. So it would be
very culpable. Likewise, it plausibly would take more insufficient
regard to get OC to do the act of stealing to afford gambling in Vegas
than stealing to afford a fancier school for one’s child. Thus, Barry’s act
would be more culpable than Mary’s. In this way, my theory can
capture either intuition one has about these cases, which attests to its
explanatory power.
Ultimately, it will be up to the legislature to decide what
description to use. To benefit defendants in such cases and not at-
tribute greater culpability to actors like Darryl and Barry, the legis-
lature should define the applicable crimes in a motive-free way. By
contrast, to prevent badly-motivated actors like Darryl from having a
defense, and to impose harsher penalties on badly-motivated actors
like Barry, the legislature should adopt a motive-laden description.
Indeed, I think this is precisely what occurs for crimes like treason,
kidnapping and hate crimes, where a specific bad purpose or motive
is included as an element. For these crimes, the legislature decided
that some kinds of bad aims or motives are especially worthy of
condemnation (perhaps because there is a special duty to avoid being
87 This is Tados’s view about the case. See supra, note 41.
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motivated by, e.g., racial animus, disloyalty to country or the desire
to terrorize victims). Thus, my theory also explains what’s going on
with exceptions to the default rule that motives don’t matter.
Still, this is only enough to account for posited culpability. What
about normative culpability – that which the law should attribute?
This notion is important for critiquing existing law and deciding
whether to adopt new offenses or defenses. There, theorists must
take a stand on how to describe the defendant’s conduct and can’t
simply defer to the legislature’s view.
I can’t fully defend it here, but my view is that a coarse-grained,
motive-free description will generally be more appropriate for sub-
stantive criminal law doctrine (i.e. the rules applicable at the guilt-
stage), though I’m open to the idea that a more fine-grained, motive-
laden description may be more appropriate at the sentencing stage,
after the defendant has been convicted. Many get accused of crimes,
but before a conviction is reached, it is not yet clear if it’s warranted
for the court to spend time and effort in closely examining the most
minute details of the case. Prior to conviction, the question is simply
which course-grained box to place the defendant into – that is, which
offense to convict him of, if any, or whether he qualifies for one of
the narrowly defined affirmative defenses. For this question, the
defendant’s mens rea (or what he was aware of) will be relevant, but
typically not his motives. By contrast, once a verdict has been
reached regarding what course-grained category the defendant be-
longs in, we can be confident that there is a basis for more closely
considering the details of the case. Thus, at sentencing, a fine-
grained, motive-laden description begins to seem more appropri-
ate.88 (I also think that at least in ideal conditions, the motive-free
description is to be preferred at the guilt-stage because this is more
88 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (including ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant’ as one of the factors to be considered in sentencing).
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beneficial to defendants.89 However, this normative argument is
beyond the scope of this paper.)
Accordingly, my theory accounts well for the complex role of
motives in the criminal law. Usually, they don’t matter because leg-
islatures (reasonably) take the course-grained, motive-free description
to be the most suitable way to define the act types to be criminalized.
But sometimes legislatures take the opposite view – as we see with hate
crimes or treason. Moreover, once the defendant is convicted, the
perquisites are met for taking a closer look at what the defendant did.
So motives might matter to the more fine-grained assessments in
sentencing. (Of course, motives may also be relevant to sentencing
because culpability is not the only relevant sentencing factor.90 A
defendant’s motives in doing the crime, and subsequent attitudes like
remorse, might help show what sentence is needed for specific
deterrence and rehabilitation. So this provides a supplementary, or
perhaps an alternative, explanation of why motives affect sentencing.)
89 I develop the argument elsewhere (see Sarch, The Moral and Legal Contours of Willful Ignorance,
chap. 3 (manuscript on file with author)), but here is the idea. The motive-free and the motive-laden
approaches come apart in two types of case. The motive-free description is better for defendants when
they are aware of some at least partially-justifying reasons for acting, but actually are motivated by
worse reasons. EVIL TROLLEY TURNER is an example. By contrast, the motive-laden approach is better for
defendants when they are actually motivated by considerations that are better than the best legally
recognized case in favor of their actions, given their beliefs. An example might be Mary’s more
sympathetic motives in GOOD THIEF, BAD THIEF. You might think Mary should get a break and be
punished less than Barry, since her motives are better than his.
It’s hard to know which kind of case is more numerous in an actual jurisdiction. But we can at least
settle the question in ideal circumstances. The key point is this: There are no cases of this second type when
the law is normatively ideal and recognizes all the reasons that it should that can help justify one’s
conduct. Assuming the law is ideal in this sense, the legally recognized reasons that support the
defendant’s conduct given her beliefs about the case will always be the best possible normative case that can
be provided in favor of her conduct, given her beliefs. For example, if Mary’s theft really is at least somewhat
(if not fully) justified by her need to be able to afford a better school for her child, then this is a
consideration that the law should recognize in some way – either as a mitigating defense, or as the basis
for convicting Mary of a less serious theft offense than someone like Barry (who stole without any
comparable need). If the law is ideal in this sense, Mary’s punishment would be reduced because the
theft was done in circumstances where it promoted a legitimate need. Thus, in such a system, she’d get
no benefit from an approach that considers her actual motives. Since the law is assumed to be ideal, this
would already be baked into the elements of the offense or give her a defense. (Granted, this would give
rise to EVIL TROLLEY TURNER type cases, where one might be aware of facts that confer at least a partial
defense but one is not motivated by those justifying facts. However, that only redounds to the benefit of
defendants.)
Thus, at least if the law is ideal – i.e. recognizes all and only the justifying circumstances it should –
there will be no cases where considering the defendant’s actual motives will benefit him in the
culpability assessment. By contrast, there will still be cases where defendants are benefitted by ignoring
his actual motives – as in EVIL TROLLEY TURNER cases. Therefore, assuming the law is ideal, the approach
that benefits defendants most is to describe ‘what he did’ in a motive-free way when assessing culpa-
bility. Thus, for normative criminal culpability, a motive-free description should ideally be used (at least
for substantive doctrine applicable at the guilt-stage).
90 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (listing factors to be considered in sentencing).
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D. Objections
Two objections demand a response. First, doesn’t my theory impute
culpability not just on the basis of the defendant’s actual conduct – even
though I’ve said this is something we generally shouldn’t do? Two
points in response. First, I grant that my theory relies on an idealized
inquiry to determine how much culpability an action manifests. But
this inquiry will never be relevant unless the failure of the defendant’s
repulsion mechanism actually helped cause her criminal action. Thus,
my theory does not impute culpability merely for counterfactual
attitudes or conduct. Instead, culpability is only imputed for actual
conduct, and it is just the amount of culpability imputed that gets
calculated using an idealized procedure. Second, any remaining aspects
of my theory that might seem ‘counterfactual’ in nature all redound to
the benefit of the accused. On my view, the defendant will never be
punished more harshly using the idealized calculation I advocate than
her actual mental states merit (i.e. the level of insufficient regard she
possessed at the time). The idealized calculation in my theory only
helps defendants, but doesn’t hurt them. This should make us more
comfortable with this idealized calculation.91
A second objection is this. Perhaps you think it’s not a problem to
overvalue something that really is valuable – say, your children’s
interests. How can it be bad, one might wonder, to care too much
about something good? David Shoemaker recently raised such an
objection to theories like mine: I could ‘take extremely seriously
your interests in doing what you want with your property but still
91 One might object to this on the basis of what I said in discussing recklessness vs. knowledge
crimes. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Doesn’t my ideal calculation impute more culpability
to D2, the regretful knowing killer, than the amount of insufficient regard she possesses at the time of
acting? Suppose D2 weighs the reasons against the killing at +10 (which is the correct amount) and the
reasons in favor at +11 (which is well above the correct amount). It might seem that D2 possesses a
fairly small amount of insufficient regard. Doesn’t my ideal calculation impute more culpability to her
than the amount she possesses?
No, the idealized calculation still imputes less culpability than the amount of insufficient regard she
actually possesses. Here’s why. Suppose that the weight D2 should have attached to the reasons in favor
of the act was only +1. She thus overvalued R+ by a factor 11. This means her repulsion mechanism
was called on to create a correspondingly large increase in the weight attached to the reasons against.
After all, that’s what’s needed to preserve the proportional relationship between the actual weight of
reasons (i.e. 10 against versus 1 in favor). But the mechanism didn’t do its job and this helped cause her
criminal act. Thus, my theory says we impute the most lenient possible amount of culpability to her for
her action – i.e. slightly more than 10- 1 = 9 units. Although D2 in fact dramatically undervalued the
reasons against the act (i.e. she assigned +10 to the reasons against when she should have assigned 11
times as much), she is treated far more leniently. In fact only +9 units of culpability are imputed to her.
Thus, on my idealized calculation, she is in fact held to be less culpable than the full amount of
insufficient regard she actually possessed at the time.
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steal from you because I weigh my [children’s interests] as slightly
more important than yours’.92 Here I seem to have sufficient regard,
but am still criminally culpable.
Granted, overvaluing something good (like one’s children’s
interests) may not be bad in itself. But it is a problem when it leads
you to attach too much weight to your kids’ interests as a reason to
do a criminal act compared to the weight you attach to the other
legally recognized reasons against doing that act. In that case, you do
manifest insufficient regard for legally protected interests. On my
view, an important aspect of criminal culpability is the proportional
relationship between the weights you attach to R+ and R-. After all,
this is what determines if your repulsion mechanism has failed. If
overvaluing your children’s interests leads you to attach a dispro-
portionally large amount of weight to R+ (the reasons in favor of A)
compared to the weight you attach to R- (the reasons against A),
then your repulsion mechanism should kick into get you to attach
correspondingly greater weight to R-. If it doesn’t, and you end up
overvaluing R+ without increasing the weight attached to R- suf-
ficiently to get you to avoid doing A, then your repulsion mechanism
has failed. That is, you end up proportionately undervaluing R-, and
that is just what having insufficient regard for the reasons not to do
A consists in. When such a repulsion failure ends up causing a
prohibited act, that is the essence of criminal culpability.9394
92 David Shoemaker, Blame and Punishment, in BLAME: Its NATURE AND NORMS 110 (D. Justin Coates
and Neal A. Tognazzini, eds., 2012).
93 That’s why overvaluing the reasons in favor of a crime can be aptly described as insufficient regard.
It’s insufficient regard for the reasons against the crime as compared to the weight you happen to attach
to the reasons you see in favor of doing it. (Nonetheless, as I’ve argued elsewhere, an overt attraction to
the reasons in favor of a crime where no such reasons exist can still be a source of heightened culpability.
See Sarch, supra note 17.)
94 One might also object that my view does not explain why strict liability crimes are legitimate.
One could be convicted of a strict liability crime even when my view says one has no criminal
culpability – e.g. if one has no insufficient regard and does a strict liability crime purely by accident. The
least amount of insufficient regard needed to get an otherwise well-motivated citizen to commit such a
violation is zero. I accept this implication. My view does not entail that those convicted of strict liability
crimes are culpable – and it’s a good thing too. This is precisely what makes strict liability crimes
troubling. Thus, on my view, if such crimes can be justified at all, it will have to be for consequentialist
reasons pursuant to some hybrid theory of punishment.
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E. Concluding Remarks: The Law as a Simplified Analog of the Moral
Landscape
A major attraction of my picture is that it preserves the continuity
between criminal culpability and moral blameworthiness. On quality
of will theories, an act is morally blameworthy to the extent it
manifests insufficient regard for the moral reasons bearing on whe-
ther to do that act. These moral reasons can in principle be as
detailed and case-specific as you like. By contrast, on my view, an act
is criminally culpable (in the posited sense) to the extent it manifests
insufficient regard for the applicable legally recognized reasons. Very
likely, the legislature cannot (and should not) recognize all moral
reasons bearing on how to act. Some might think one is less morally
blameworthy for a theft if the motive for it is to help one’s child, but
the legislature may reasonably decline to recognize this as a con-
sideration that justifies theft even partially. Thus, the landscape of
legally recognized reasons that determine culpability is, and likely
should be, more anemic than the richer landscape of moral reasons
that affect blameworthiness. (The law may also recognize reasons
that map onto no corresponding moral reason.) My view thus pre-
serves a structural analogy between criminal culpability and moral
blameworthiness, while also respecting the differences between the
two. The former tracks one’s responses to a different, thinner set of
reasons than the latter.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE MANIFESTATION REQUIREMENT
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LENITY
Thus far, I’ve been mainly concerned with descriptive adequacy. I
have not said much about why the law should adopt its current
skeptical stance toward punishing mere bad attitudes. Even if the
data-points my theory aims to capture reflect posited culpability in
Anglo-American systems, why think this matches the correct attri-
butions of normative culpability? To fill this gap, let me sketch an
argument for why one’s view of culpability should include a Mani-
festation Requirement and Principle of Lenity, and thus deliver re-
sults roughly in line with existing law.
My argument draws in part on practical considerations and our
epistemic limitations, but it puts them to use in a principled way.
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The argument is supposed to explain why one-off cases of punishing
merely for bad attitudes, or for one’s willingness to offend under
counterfactual circumstances, would not be permitted when our
practical limitations are only temporarily or locally alleviated. Specif-
ically, I offer a contractualist argument that supports broad principles
that would be accepted in any world with the same stable back-
ground conditions as ours.95
Suppose that in entering into civil society, we agree not to engage
in certain kinds of conduct, and cede to the state the right punish
such proscribed conduct. In negotiating, under the veil of ignorance,
what rules will govern our lives in civil society, it would make sense
for us to only make the least burdensome concessions we have to in
order to obtain the benefits of the social contract. Now consider
three possible criminal justice regimes. In the maximalist regime,
punishments are doled out according to the full amount of insuffi-
cient regard (i.e. bad attitudes) one happens to possess, regardless of
whether it is manifested in action. In the minimalist regime, one is
only punished for insufficient regard that is manifested in conduct,
and the amount manifested is determined in accordance with a
principle of lenity as my theory suggests. Third, the intermediary
regime includes a rudimentary manifestation-like requirement but no
lenity principle. Thus, one’s culpability equals the level of insufficient
regard that actually causes one’s actions, even if it’s not fully mani-
fested under the lenity principle.
The minimalist regime, I contend, offers contracting parties the
best deal. To see why, consider some cases of unmanifested mental
states:
(a) Charlie drives off intending to kill his uncle, and in his distracted state
hits and kills a pedestrian who just happens to be his uncle.
(b) Alan burns down an unoccupied building for $5000, though we know
for a fact he’d be willing to burn it down for the same sum of money
even if he knew a person was inside.
Both the maximalist and intermediary regime would take Charlie to
be guilty of murder and Alan to be guilty of a higher grade of arson
95 Of course, the argument thus inherits all the familiar problems with contractualist arguments. See,
e.g., Philip Stratton-Lake, Scanlon’s Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection, 63 ANALYSIS 70 (2003).
Space does not allow me to answer them here. But permit me to adopt a contractualist framework to
merely illustrate the line of thinking that would support the Principle of Lenity and the Manifestation
Requirement on which my theory relies.
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that is appropriate when the arsonist knows a person was in the
building. Charlie and Alan not only possess levels of insufficient
regard that are associated, respectively, with murder and the higher
grade of arson; in addition, their conduct is also caused by their high
levels insufficient regard, and so would count as manifested in the
intermediary regime. By contrast, in the minimalist regime, Charlie
is guilty only of negligent homicide, and Alan is guilty of the lower
grade of arson used when the building is unoccupied.
My claim, then, is that rational actors negotiating behind the veil
of ignorance would prefer the minimalist regime to either the
maximalist or intermediary regime. That is because the minimalist
regime involves far less burdensome concessions than the other re-
gimes, while also providing nearly the same benefits in terms of
harm prevention. Thus, the net expected benefit of the minimalist
regime substantially outweighs that of the other two.
Why is this? Begin with the benefits of the competing regimes.
Agreeing to be punishable for the full amount of animosity or cal-
lousness towards others that we possess or is merely involved in
causing our actions, even when its full extent is not manifested,
would provide scant benefits compared to agreeing to be punishable
only for the insufficient regard our conduct manifests in my sense.
After all, when others harbor hateful thoughts or disrespectful atti-
tudes towards us, but don’t act in ways that bring the full badness of
these attitudes to light, the extra harm we suffer from the unmani-
fested badness of these attitudes is extremely limited – if there is any
extra injury at all. When Charlie or Alan are merely willing to act in
worse ways than they did, but don’t have occasion to manifest this
willingness, there is little or no extra injury from the mere willing-
ness. That means that there is little or no additional harm to be
prevented in cases of unmanifested mental states (the only cases
where the regimes differ) by imposing the greater punishments of
the maximalist or intermediary regimes. The overall level of harm to
be prevented is roughly the same if we focus on either (a) defen-
dants’ actions plus the full amount of insufficient regard they pos-
sessed or acted on at the time, or (b) their actions plus the
insufficient regard these actions manifest (understood according to
the principle of lenity). Thus, there is little call, on protective
grounds, for preferring the maximalist or intermediary regime to the
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minimalist regime. Assuming the three regimes already provide
adequate harm prevention (i.e. a sufficient baseline level of deter-
rence), there will be no reason to move beyond the minimalist
regime to the maximalist or intermediary version. There is no sig-
nificant added harm from unmanifested insufficient regard that this is
needed to prevent.96
Now consider the concessions involved. Most importantly, to accept
the maximalist or intermediary regimes, and thus agree to be punishable
for the full level of hateful thoughts, uncaring attitudes or willingness to
harm that happens to play some causal role in getting one to act, would
entail enormous enforcement-related costs compared to the minimalist
regime.97 Enforcing the rules of the maximalist or intermediary regimes
would be heavily invasive. It would require allowing the state to
investigate and concern itself with evidence of whether one possesses or
was even partly motivated by insufficiently respectful attitudes –
including one’s utterances and writings. This would undermine the
substantial benefits we get from privacy and unencumbered speech.
These include the benefits of getting to consider dubious hypotheticals
and mull over a range of thoughts and plans (some perhaps quite bad)
before deciding how to act – not to mention the feeling of safety we
might get from having a private, protected mental space. Thus, giving
the state the amount of control over us required to implement the
maximalist or intermediary regimes would involve heavy costs, which
the minimalist regime largely avoids.
96 An anonymous reviewer points out that the maximalist or intermediary regime might have
advantages in providing more general deterrence than the minimalist regime. However, in comparing
these regimes, we should keep all else equal. Thus, we should assume that the regimes all include a
baseline level of punishment that gives adequate general deterrence. (It would be unfair to assume that
the one regime provides deficient deterrence.) My point, then, is that there is very little additional harm
from unmanifested bad attitudes that we would need to combat by ratcheting up the level of deter-
rence. Thus, assuming all three regimes are on a par in offering adequate deterrence, there is little call
on protective grounds to move from the minimalist regime to something more burdensome like the
maximalist or intermediate regime.
Consider an analogy. Suppose we are considering enhancing punishments for crimes committed by
people who have a disfavored attitude like a preference chocolate ice cream. Let’s say there is no
independent harm in preferring chocolate ice cream. Granted, we could get more general deterrence
from increasing punishments for those who commit crimes with this disfavored attitude. But assuming
the existing punishments – without any such enhancement – do not leave significant harms undeterred,
then there is little protective reason to enhance punishments further by moving to a regime that imposes
harsher penalties on those who prefer chocolate ice cream.
97 A further cost of the maximalist or intermediary regime compared to the minimalist regime is, of
course, that the former entail greater punishments should we ever find ourselves in the position of
Charlie or Alan, acting criminally without fully manifesting all our insufficient regard. The greater
harms imposed by the maximalist and intermediary regimes on contracting parties who break the law
also affect the calculus.
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Accordingly, the bargain offered by the maximalist or interme-
diary regimes – i.e. agreeing to be punishable also for any bad atti-
tude that one possesses (in the maximalist case) or is any part of
what causes one to act (in the intermediary case) in exchange for
others agreeing to the same – just does not seem worth it. The
bargain offered by the minimalist regime, by contrast, with its
Manifestation Requirement and Principle of Lenity, seems a better
deal. It offers greater net benefits. The bargain that seems to do the
best job of providing the negotiating parties with tangible and
valuable benefits, in exchange for minimally costly concessions, is to
agree to be punishable only for the degree of insufficient regard that
is manifested in conduct, determined according to the Principle of
Lenity (i.e. construed in the light most favorable to the accused).
Thus, the negotiating parties likely would prefer the minimalist
regime. It is doubtful that those negotiating behind the veil of
ignorance would rationally agree to be punishable for the full extent
of the insufficient regard they happen to possess or that merely helps
cause their actions – as in the cases of Charlie and Alan. The benefits
we, as potential victims, get from extracting such concessions from
the Charlies and Alans of the world are not very great – certainly not
substantial enough to justify the steep costs of punishing us for our
unmanifested bad attitudes.
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